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Abstract
This research examines the contract year phenomenon in a new context, by
evaluating player performance relative to other players, rather than the same
player over time. Since ordinary least-squares (OLS) methods assume independent
observations, results may be biased as player performance is dependent on other
players. As such, a Bayesian approach to allow for non-independence among
player performance is used to evaluate players in contract years relative to their
peers. Using novel performance data of National Football League (NFL) players
and controlling for player salary, position, experience, and team effects, the results
show that contract year players under-perform relative to players not in a contract
year. Furthermore, increasing salary exhibits a greater negative effect on the
performance of contract year players. The findings suggest managers would get
more performance from players, on average, by not having players play during a
contract year.
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Research Problem Addressed
The purpose of this research is to look at the performance of contract year
athletes relative to their non-contract year peers. This comparison is important
to team managers as players have differing levels of cost and performance and
managers face salary cap restrictions. Prior research into the contract year
phenomenon has examined the player’s prior year performance to performance in
the contract year. Given the managerial focus on comparing across players, this
research adds a new perspective by comparing the performance of contract year
players to players not in a contract year.
This research also makes a contribution by using a novel data set of
comprehensive player performance rather than outcome scoring statistics. Indeed,
assessing the performance of players who are not directly tied to scoring metrics
(such as cornerbacks and offensive lineman in American football) is challenging.
An additional contribution is the use of Bayesian statistical techniques by allowing
for non-independent observations. This avoids the bias in ordinary least-squares
methods (OLS) in which observations are assumed to be independent. The results
show that contract year players perform worse than players not in a contract year.
This effect is further moderated by salary: While higher salaries are positively
associated with performance, on average, contract year players who earn more
money further under-perform.
This research is useful to managers in determining whether to retain players
in the final year of their contract. Agents, coaches, and others who are involved
in contracts, salary, and personnel decisions will also find this research to be of
interest.

Background
In professional sports, players who are in the final year of their contract
are “hungry” to perform. The incentive for higher performance achievement
is rewarded through a new contract (and likely higher salary). By performing
well, the player hopes to draw interest not only from his current team but from
other potential teams. Prior research has shown that contract year performance
improves over the prior year in the National Basketball Association (Stiroh, 2007;
White & Sheldon, 2014), Major League Baseball (White & Sheldon, 2014), and
German soccer (Frick, 2011).
However, these findings are rooted in the player’s performance during the
contract year when compared to the same player’s performance in the prior year,
or a measure within player. While team managers consider this reference point,
another reference point is that player performance is relative to the other players.
This comparison between players is rooted in the cost-benefit trade-off as to which
players a team will offer contracts.
Recent sports phenomenon into player comparisons have become increasingly
important for academics and managers. For instance, baseball statisticians
2
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emphasize “wins above replacement” (WAR), which examines a player’s
performance relative to a replaceable player at minimum salary (Cameron, 2009).
“Wins over replacement player” (WORP) has been similarly applied for hockey
goalies (Shea & Baker, 2012). “Wins produced” (WP), as applied to basketball
players, objectively ties player box score statistics to team wins to compare which
players create more wins (Berri, 2008; Berri, 2015; Berri & Schmidt, 2010). Across
all three measures, an emphasis is placed on evaluating player contributions
relative to their peers.
Method
A key concern for managers is whether to sign players who are in their
final year of a contract. To examine the performance of contract year players, a
comprehensive data set was used. While outcome scoring metrics are useful—
such as touchdowns in football, home runs in baseball, and goals in hockey—there
are many plays in the game in which the player is not even touching the ball, let
alone scoring. Indeed, measuring worker quality is difficult, and even key scoring
metrics seem “inadequate” (DeBrock, Hendricks, & Koenker, 2004). Consider an
offensive lineman in American football. Evaluating his performance is difficult
(Byanna & Klabjan, 2016) because he does not throw, carry, or catch the football.
Even metrics such as penalties or sacks allowed may not adequately measure the
true performance of an offensive lineman. Complicating measurement is that
player performance is interdependent with other players, namely their teammates
and opponents.
One data source that addresses this is ProFootballFocus.com (PFF), where
staff members examine every player on every single play. Two experts at PFF grade
each player on every play on a scale of -2 to +2 in 0.5 increments. A third expert
is brought in when the first two experts differ. For example, a “check-down” pass
by a quarterback for a short gain might have a minimal positive rating (+0.5),
whereas a deep pass with a degree of difficulty might be judged +1.5 or +2.0. Even
a throw-away incomplete pass to avoid a sack or stop the clock might be graded
as neutral rather than purely negative. All players are graded. Offensive guards
will earn positive grades for making blocks, more so if they can continue blocking
downfield for the ball carrier. Cornerbacks receive highest grades for making an
interception, positive grades for deflecting a pass, positive or perhaps neutral grades
for stopping a ball carrier for no gain, and negative grades for missing a tackle that
should have been made. By summing each player’s performance on every single
play of every single game, a comprehensive view of player performance is taken.
The data used here covers all plays from the 2008 regular season of the National
Football League (NFL), the only year that had been made publicly available upon
request. Additional years of data are feasibly available only to the teams, agents,
media, and investors. For the analysis, players who played at least 25% of team
snaps (plays) are included. This threshold retains the bulk of meaningful players,
omitting players who may have played in only a few games or those who are
3
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involved in only a few plays in each game (such as punters and placekickers).
While longitudinal data has its benefits, of interest here is player performance
relative to other players in the same season.
The determination of whether a player was playing in a contract year comes
from KFFL.com (which has since been acquired by USA Today newspapers and
renamed TheHuddle.com). This denotes whether the player is in the final year of
their contract or not. For instance, a rookie in the last year of their rookie contract
is a contract year player.
Several other control variables are considered that might account for player
performance. One is salary. Player salary for the 2008 season comes from Spotrac.
com, a website dedicated to sports salary and contract information. As a financial
incentive to perform, higher paid players are typically expected to have higher
performance.
Two, performance may be attributed to the player’s position on the field.
Since player performance is influenced by the other players, of critical importance
is the quarterback. Quarterbacks are the highest paid players in the league
(Weintraub, 2007), touching the ball on almost every single offensive play. Hence,
their performance will impact every other player on the field, often making
quarterbacks the “face of the franchise” (Berri et al., 2007).
Three, prior research has shown experience to be related to performance
(Krautmann & Solow, 2009; Scully, 1989; Sommers, 2008). Performance should
improve over time as the player learns and gains experience. Beyond a certain
point, however, play will drop off. This has been similarly found regressing age
on performance (Fair, 2008; Schell, 2005), and is not surprising since age and
experience are likely highly correlated. To account for these effects of diminishing
performance over time, experience (EXPER) and its squared term (EXPER2) are
included (e.g., Berri and Simmons, 2009a).1 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics
of the variables.
A total of 1,007 players were retained for analysis. Player grades (PERFORM)
for the regular season ranged from -42.2 to +58.1 with a mean of +1.39. Although
sports are typically zero-sum games, the player average is slightly positive. Players
who especially underperform are at risk of being benched or outright released
by the team. Thus, teams will replace these players and take a chance on a player
who might perform better. Player salary (LNSALARY) is the player’s salary, logtransformed to account for skewness. Salaries ranged from a league minimum of
$295,000 to as much as $18.7 million. The mean salary was $2.4 million. Fifteen
players with no salary data were entered at the league minimum. A further
justification for separating out the quarterback position (QB) is that quarterbacks
had a mean average performance score of 22.2. Excluding quarterbacks, the
average performance is 0.60 and close to zero for every other position.
1
A fourth control variable, the player’s draft position, was considered but not utilized, as prior
research (Berri & Simmons, 2009b) has shown no statistical relation between draft pick and NFL
performance of quarterbacks, which is the focal player position here.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for the Variables of Interest
Variable
PERFORM
CONTRACTYR
QB
SALARY ($ mil)
EXPER (years)

N
1,007
284
37
1,007
1,007

Median
0.1
-1.2
21.0
1.56
5

Mean
1.39
-0.41
22.22
2.40
5.18

St. Dev
11.50
9.44
16.68
2.37
3.33

Min
-42.2
-28.7
-1.5
0.30
0

Max
58.1
33.4
58.1
18.70
18

In the data, 284 players (or 28.2% of the players analyzed) were in their contract
year (CONTRACTYR). The descriptive statistics for these contract year players is
also listed in Table 1. One question may be whether team managers “lock up” the
better players on the roster to contracts, leaving the lesser-talented players to play
through a contract year. This is not always the case, as teams sometimes let Pro
Bowl players play out the last year of their contracts to see how they perform. For
instance, in the first week of the 2017 NFL free agency period, Pro Bowl players
Dontari Poe, Jay Cutler, Alshon Jeffery, Cordarrelle Patterson, Adrian Peterson,
and Andrew Whitworth were not signed by their respective teams as those
teams signed arguably lesser talented players to fill their positions. This further
emphasizes that team managers weigh the player against their peers amid costs.
The contract year players also had a range of experience: their league experience
ranged from 1 to 18 years, with a mean average of 6.2 years (SD = 3.33). In fact,
21.8% of contract year players had three or less years in the league, while 28.9% of
contract year players had eight or more years of NFL experience.
The performance of player i is modeled as a linear model (e.g., Torgler &
Schmitt, 2007) as shown in Equation 1. The model captures team-level fixed
effects (α) for each team, j, as differences in cultures and coaching may be a factor
of performance:
PERFORMij = αj + β0 + β1*(CONTRACTYRij) + β2*(LNSALARYij)
+β3*(QBij) + β4* (CONTRACTYRij*LNSALARYij) +
β5*(EXPERij) + β6*(EXPER2ij) + eij
(1)

Results
Since a player’s performance is correlated to his teammates and opposing
players, observations are not independent. As such, non-independence of
observations violates a key assumption of traditional ordinary least-squares (OLS)
methods and will result in biased estimates. An approach that accommodates
this is a Bayesian estimation that uses a Gibbs sampler of the entire player space
5
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to borrow information and shrink the estimates. The Bayesian method uses
a uniform (uninformative) prior, with a burn-in of 1,000 iterations and 20,000
iterations after burn-in.
Table 2 gives the results of successive model building of Equation 1, reporting
the coefficient estimates, posterior distributions of the Bayesian analysis, and
measures of model fit (Deviance Information, Criterion, or DIC). Model 1a shows
the effect of just contract year status on performance (β = -2.10, p < .01), indicating
that contract year players, on average, under-perform non-contract year players
by more than two performance points. When salary is considered (Model 1b),
contract year players still under-perform (β = -2.00, p < .05). Model 1c accounts
for the importance of quarterbacks, again finding that contract year players underperform their contracted peers (β = -1.59, p < .05).
Model 1d includes an interaction term between contract year status and

Table 2
Estimation Results. Dependent Variable: Player Performance
Model 1a
Model 1b
Model 1c
Variable
Coefficient SD
Coefficient SD
Coefficient SD
-0.10 1.97
-1.69 1.93
-2.05 1.81
Intercept
-2.10 0.79 ***
-2.00 0.78 **
-1.59 0.72 **
CONTRACTYR
2.35 0.35 ***
1.81 0.34 ***
LNSALARY
20.01 1.73 ***
QB
CONTRACTYR*LNSALARY
EXPER
EXPER2
DIC

7,731.6

7,688.5

7,559.1

Model 1d
Model 1e
Model 1f
Variable
Coefficient SD
Coefficient SD
Coefficient SD
-2.18 1.81
-2.18 1.92
-2.22 2.04
Intercept
-1.06 0.78
-1.07 0.81
-1.09 0.84
CONTRACTYR
2.18 0.39 ***
2.18 0.48 ***
2.17 0.54 ***
LNSALARY
19.85 1.73 ***
19.85 1.75 ***
19.86 1.75 ***
QB
-1.34 0.74 *
-1.33 0.78 *
CONTRACTYR*LNSALARY
-1.34 0.74 *
-0.00 0.13
0.03 0.38
EXPER
-0.00 0.03
EXPER2
7,559.9
DIC
7,557.8
7,561.9
Note: posterior standard deviation (SD) reported as credible intervals. Team-level fixed effects not sho
*** Significant at the 1% level

** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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salary. One consideration for its inclusion is that contract year players may exhibit
differences in performance due to salary. Its inclusion absorbs some of the main
effect (β = -1.06, p > .10) as contract year status remains negative and the interaction
shows negative effects (β = -1.34, p < .10) on performance. Model 1e brings player
experience into the equation, while Model 1f further adds the experience-squared
term to account for declining performance over a player’s career. In both models,
contract year players still under-perform non-contract year players. Among the
six models estimated, Model 1d had the best fit (DIC = 7,557.8).2 Across models,
there is support that contract year players perform worse than players not playing
in a contract year, and that the effect is further moderated by salary.
Several robustness checks were conducted. Model 1c was re-estimated for all
player positions, but QB was the only significant position (p < .05); this model
had worse fit (DIC = 7,565.4) compared to just including QB. For most positions,
the mean performance was closer to zero, unlike that of quarterbacks. Model 1f
was re-estimated without team-level fixed effects and instead used two proxies for
team success: team wins in the prior season or making the playoffs in the prior
season. The results do not change for the focal variables, and provide worse model
fit than the team-level fixed effects (DIC = 7,613.9 and 7,614.9, respectively). A
final consideration is that teams may be forward-looking to “lock up” players to
contract extensions before the player enters their contract year. By including the
performance of these players, it may be skewing the comparison of contract year
players to all players. Data from Spotrac found only 15 contract extensions and/or
restructurings for the 2008 NFL season. The performance of these players ranged
from -13.1 to 29.5 (inclusive of quarterbacks), with an average performance of 2.6
(inclusive of quarterbacks). Model 1f was re-estimated excluding these players; the
results were not substantially different from the current reporting.3
Implications
Managers are interested in a player’s performance relative to other players.
This study contributes to our understanding of contract year players by examining
the phenomenon between players rather than within a player. When viewed in this
way, contract year players achieve worse performance than their non-contract year
peers. Furthermore, as player salary increases, contract year player performance
decreases.
One explanation for this contract year effect is that professional athletes are
2
Due to the non-independence issues, a traditional R2 cannot be reported. As a point of interest, the R2LQ0RGHOGXVLQJ2/6DQGWHDP¿[HGHIIHFWVLV
3
Additionally, a t-test was estimated comparing the performance of players who received
DFRQWUDFWH[WHQVLRQWRDOOSOD\HUV t = .44, p > .66), as well as comparing their performance to
contract year players (t = 1.29, p! ,QQHLWKHULQVWDQFHZHUHWKHPHDQVVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHUHQW
DOWKRXJKFDXWLRQVKRXOGEHH[HUFLVHGRQPDNLQJDQLQIHUHQFHIURPVXFKDVPDOOVDPSOHVL]H

7

Contract Year Phenomenon and the Bayesian Method

under pressure to perform. The contract year (and heightened expectations that
come with higher salaries) raises expectations to succeed, which in turn raise
performance pressures (e.g., Baumeister, Hamilton, & Tice, 1985). These pressures
may be too much for most athletes in their contract year. Another explanation
may be that managers allow players to play out their contract years as an option
to reduce uncertainty: the manager knows something about the player’s abilities,
so the manager may take a “wait-and-see” approach to the player’s performance.
The findings indicate managers should reconsider the value of contract year
players and their ability to perform. In particular, an average effect of increasing
salary corresponds to even worse performance for contract year players. This
suggests contract year players should not be highly paid; teams may be better
served by restructuring the contracts of highly paid players in the final year
of their contract to extend the player’s contract. One consideration may be for
managers to substantially reduce the number of contract year players on its team.
Doing so, however, will limit the manager’s options to add or eliminate players
from the roster. As such, an optimal number of contract year players on a roster
may exist that balances these trade-offs, presenting an avenue for future research
in this area.
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